

2-12
8-26
Aer-MA-610/279

20 APR 1958

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on NAAS Kingsville AAR ser 13-57
concerning TV-2 BuNo 138043 accident occurring 17 Jul 57

From: Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

Ref: (a) Telcon between CNO (OP-57) and Chief, Bureau of
Aeronautics (MA-61) of 14 April 1958

1. By reference (a) an agreement was reached for the forwarding of certain Aircraft Accident Reports without engineering comments.
2. The basic report with subsequent endorsements meets the criteria of reference (a) and is forwarded less comment.



(b) (6)

By direction

ORIGINAL

26 SEP 1957

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PART VII OF NAVINST 3750.6B

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on NAAS Kingsville AAR ser 13-57, concerning TV-2,
BUNO 138043, crash land 17 July 1957, Pilot HASKINS

From: Chief of Naval Air Training
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-57)
Via: (1) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER-512)
(2) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusion and recommendations of the Board as modified by the second endorsement. Concur in the action and comments indicated in the first endorsement.

(b) (6)

by direction

Copy to:
NAVAVESAFETYCN (2)
CHAVANTRA
BAR, Lockheed, Burbank
Navy PLTS PLTAS/CHOPFF R/FBR
Morton AFB, San Bernardino, California
ATU's 101, 203, 205, 206, 212, 213
JTU Olathe
CO NAS CORPUS CHRISTI (2)
CO NAAS CHASE FIELD
Lockheed Rep., NAS CORPUS CHRISTI
CO NAAS KINGSVILLE (4)

02

NEL/05
A25/AAR

5 SEP 1957

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on NAAS Kingsville AAR Ser 13-57, concerning TV-2, BuNo 138043, accident occurring 17 July 1957, pilot HASKINS

From: Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Air Training
(2) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (NA-61)
(3) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

Ref: (a) NAS CorpC O&R LES No. 51-53 Addendum No. 29 of 29 July 1957

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and with all but the first recommendation of the Aircraft Accident Board. The comments of the first endorsement are noted and concurred in with the exception of paragraph 2, which has reference to the Board's first recommendation.

2. Reference (a) has been promulgated to all TV-2 units of this Command and provides for the replacement of the existing transmitter float guard in the earlier series TV-2 airplanes and the addition of this improved transmitter float guard to the later series TV-2 aircraft. In addition, reference (a) required the replacement of the cylindrical type float of tank unit EA565W-553 to the ball type float of tank unit EA565W-1339. It is strongly believed that these improvements will eliminate erroneous indications of fuel quantity in the main fuselage tank, as has occurred too often in the past.

3. The Board's first recommendation has merit but is not concurred with because the changes outlined in reference (a), when incorporated, should provide reliable fuel quantity indications of the fuselage tanks. In addition, the changing to a capacitance type system, taking time to process an aircraft service change, available funds and age of the majority of the TV-2 airplanes into consideration, is not considered realistic.

4. A system of fuel management in which all fuel tank switches are gangbarred immediately after take-off vice manually controlling has been recommended to all TV-2 units of this Command, but as brought out by the Board's second recommendation and paragraph 2. of the first endorsement, this procedure has certain objections unless a fuel flow detector is provided to alert the pilot he is losing fuel through the overboard drain.

5. The comments of paragraph 4. of the first endorsement are highly concurred in. The latest information to this Headquarters is that the delivery of the

NEL/05 : 5 SEP 1957
A25/AAR

remaining quantities of 650 automatic parachute devices, allocated to CNAVANTRA by ASO Speedletter of 19 February 1957, are scheduled to commence during the second week of September 1957.

F. R. Drake

F. R. DRAKE
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
BUAER (MA-61)
NAVAVSAFCEN (2)
BAR, Lockheed, Burbank
Navy FLTSAFLIAISONOFF D/FSR
Norton AFB, San Bernardino, Calif.
ATU's 101, 203, 205, 206, 212, 213
JITU, NAS Olathe
Av. Safety Offr., NAS CorpC (2)
Av. Safety Offr., NAAS Chase Fld
Lockheed Rep., NAS CorpC
Av. Safety Offr., NAAS Kingsville (2)
CO, NAAS Kingsville (2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART VII OPNAVINST 3750.6B

U. S. NAVAL AUXILIARY AIR STATION
KINGSVILLE, TEXAS

NAL7(2)/903

A25

Ser: 4122

AUG 21 1957

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on NAAS Kingsville AAR 13-57, concerning TV-2, BuNo
138043, accident occurring 17 July 1957, pilot HASKINS

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-57)
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training
(2) Chief of Naval Air Training
(3) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (MA-61)
(4) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the Board's conclusion and recommendations with the following additional comments.

2. The Board's first recommendation is considered to merit consideration as a permanent fix. Subsequent to this accident CNAVANTRA promulgated a solution to the problem of the fuselage fuel quantity indicator float sticking in the "UP" or "FULL" position. The possibility of the float sticking in the "FULL" position is still a problem in the later series of the aircraft if the screen type fuel guard is broken and is undetected since the float could become stuck on a broken strand of the screen.

3. The Board's second recommendation is considered to be worthy of immediate attention. The fact that fuel can be pumped overboard undetected by the pilot has always been a problem in this aircraft. Pilots are very much aware of this, and therefore have been very reluctant to "GANGBAR" the fuel switches, especially during cross-country flights. Although the installation of a fuel flow detector in the overboard drain does not solve the basic problem of fuel system malfunction, it would warn the pilot of the malfunction so that he could land the aircraft at the nearest facility prior to fuel starvation.

4. The need for installation of automatic parachute opening device is considered to warrant immediate action. It is obvious that the personnel aboard this aircraft had little chance of successful ejection even though the automatic lap belts were installed. The latest information from test data reveals that successful ejections can be accomplished as low as 500 feet altitude with both automatic lap belt and automatic parachute opener installed.

5. This accident will be given wide dissemination.

Copy to:

1cc BUAIR (MA-61)

2cc USNAVAVSAFECEN

1cc BAR, LOCKHEED, BURBANK

1cc Navy FITSAFFILIATIONOFFD/FSR Norton AFB, San Bernardino, Calif

1cc ATU's 101, 203, 205, 206, 212, 213

1cc JTTU Olathe

2cc Av. Safety Off., NAS CorpC

1cc Av. Safety Off., NAAS Chase Field

1cc Lockheed Rep., NAS CorpC

W. A. SULLIVAN

CRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

AV FORM 3750-1 (REV. 11-55)

E 1

See Instructions for completion
prior to filling outSPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART II OF AVIATION SAFETY CENTER FORM 3750-1

ORIGINAL

PART I - GENERAL

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD CONVENED BY:

NAAS Kingsville (ATU-212)

2. DATE OF ACCIDENT TIME 17 July 1957 2134 CST 13-57

3. TO:

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op-57)

5. ENCLOSURES: (1) Medical Officer's Report

(2) Flight Clearance (ND175)

4. VIA: (1) Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training

(3) Jet Single Engine Type Flight Log

(2) Chief of Naval Air Training

(4) Statements of Tower Operators

(3) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (AER-512)

(5) Disassembly & Investigation Report

(4) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

(6) Aircraft Crash Fire Report

(5)

(7) Diagram of Impact Area

(6)

(8) through (17) Photographs

(LAST) DIRECTOR, U. S. NAV. AV. SAFETY CENTER

(9)

7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (if different than item number 1)

8. ACTIVITY OPERATING AIRCRAFT (if different than item 7)

NAAS Kingsville (ATU-212)

9. KIND OF FLT. 10. TIME OF DAY

3D22 (C-7)

☐ DAWN☐ DAY☐ DUSK☒ NIGHT

11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT

5 mi SSE NAAS Kingsville

12. ELEV. ABOVE SEA LEVEL

50 feet

13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE-OFF

NAS Pensacola, Florida

14. CLEARED

FROM NAS Forest Sherman to NAAS Kingsville

15. TYPE CLEARANCE:

☒ IFR☐ VFR☐ LOCAL☐ OPERATIONAL☒ AIRWAYS☐ DIRECT☐ OTHER, Specify

16. TIME IN FLT. 17. TYPE ACCIDENT

1.8

B-6 Crash landing (flame-out)

18. PHASE OF FLIGHT

(6) Jet-down

19. MODEL

TV-2

20. SERIAL NO.

138043

21. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

☒ A.☐ B.☐ C.☐ D.

22. DOL. COST

\$132,000

23. AIRSPEED (Kts)

+/- 130

24. A/C WT.

11,220

25. LIST MODEL, SER. NOS. REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (complete separate OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)

7. PERSONNEL

2. NAME (last, first and middle initial)

3. RANK

4. FIC

5. DESIG

6. DATE DESIG

7. DATE OF BIRTH

8. AGE

PILOT (PERSON AT CONTROLS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT)

HASKINS, Harry L.

LCDR

(b) (6)

2-23-43

3-27-19

38

CO-PILOT

BURROWS, Alfred P.

ENS

6-10-32

25

8. PERSONNEL

9. OPERATIONAL FLT. TRAINER

10. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED

11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD

AVAILABLE?

USED?

PILOT

☒ YES ☐ NO☒ YES ☐ NO

ATU-212

☒ STANDARD☐ SPECIAL

Dual

☒ YES ☐ NO☒ YES ☐ NO

ATU-212

☐ STANDARD☐ SPECIAL

TOTAL PILOT HOURS

ITEM

PILOT

CO-PILOT

STUDENT

ITEM

PILOT

CO-PILOT

STUDENT

ALL MODELS

3212.9

272.7

CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT

30/40

6/0

ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MOS.

143.8

176.9

FCLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT

78/100

56/0

ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MOS.

71.7

83.9

INSTRUMENT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS

17.1

42.8

ALL SERIES THIS MODEL

215.6

39.9

NIGHT HOURS, LAST 3 MOS.

13.6

2.5

ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 12 MONTHS

126.1

39.9

(jet accidents only) TOTAL JET PILOT HOURS

269.0

39.9

ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 3 MONTHS

68.9

39.9

DATE LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL

17 July 1957

1.8

NAME (last, first and middle initial)

RANK

FILE NO.

ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED

INJURY

BILLET

EQUIP.

TICN

1. HASKINS, Harry L.

LCDR

(b) (6)

ATU-212

A

Pilot F. Seat

2. BURROWS, Alfred P.

ENS

(b) (6)

ATU-212

A

S. Pilot R. Seat

(if additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 5750-1

1. CEILING High
2. VISIBILITY 10 mi.
3. WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY SE 10 knots
4. TEMPERATURE 82°
5. OUTSIDE RUNWAY DEW POINT
6. ALTIMETER SETTINGS 29.91

OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing levels, state of sea, etc., if pertinent to accident)

ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P	S	ITEM	P
PILOT ERROR			LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER ERROR			MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION	
CREW ERROR			OTHER PERSONNEL ERROR, Specify			MATERIAL INADEQUACY	
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ERROR			ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR			ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ROUGH SEAS	
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ERROR			AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES			UNDETERMINED	X
SERVICING PERSONNEL ERROR			WEATHER			OTHER, Specify	

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIERS (Complete following Section on Pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED
2. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED
3. DAY-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT
5. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED
6. NIGHT-HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS

PART II - MAINTENANCE MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
2-18-55	1	26	0	1224.7	1228.7	180-hr.	36.3	27
1-19-55	J33-A20	AD85664	1	127.5	462.1	120-hr.	36.3	29

a. DID FIRE OCCUR: ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☒ AFTER ACCIDENT ☐ DID NOT OCCUR b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. CHECK IF APPLICABLE: ☐ AMP FUR SERIAL ☒ YES ☐ NO d. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? ☒ YES ☐ NO e. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED

CHECK BELOW ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. ☐ AIRCRAFT DESIGN d. ☒ UNDETERMINED g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES
b. ☐ AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g. cockpit configurations)
c. ☐ MAINTENANCE f. ☐ OTHER, Specify

A. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION Approx. 800 ft. B. AIR SPEED (Kts) NA C. OPERATING TEMPERATURE NA D. WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT 11,200 E. C.G. (NAC) NA F. KIND OF FUEL JP-4 G. FUEL PRESSURE Unknown

H. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION None I. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT Undetermined

J. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List Stock and Ser. nos., give time since new or overhauled) Stock #190042-1, Serial #128027
Overhauled 6-5-57; Installed 7-12-57 K. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C NA

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

SECTION B - FACILITIES DATA

- | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> CATAPULT
G. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: <input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR | | B. PRESSURE
SETTINGS | C. WIND OVER
DECK | D. RELATIVE
HEADWIND | E. APPROACH
SPEED (MPH-1
READING) |
| F. MARK NUMBER G. MODEL NO. H. LOCATION ON SHIP | | I. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION USED | | | |
| J. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED | | | | | |

K. THIS PORTION SHALL BE COMPLETED WHENEVER (1) A MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT OR (2) AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES MALFUNCTIONING OF ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT. MINOR ACCIDENTS OR ROUTINE DAMAGE TO CABLES, WELDINGS AND OTHER EXPENDABLE COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE REPORTED.

TESTING AND OTHER EXPENDABLE COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE RECORDED							COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings and months in service)
ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS		CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMU- LATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	
			CONSTANT PRESSURE				
			DOMESTIC (P.S.I.)	RATIO			
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART III - REMARKS (continue on separate pages if necessary)

A. Approximately \$200.00
B. None

Copy to: 1cc BUAER (AER-512)
2cc USNAVAVSAPCEN
1cc BAR, Lockheed, Burbank
1cc Navy FLTSA/PLIASLONOFFD/FSR Norton AFB, San Bernardino
1cc ATU's 101, 203, 205, 206, 212, 213
1cc JTTU Olathe
2cc Av. Safety Off., NAS CorpC
1cc Av. Safety Off., NAAS Chase
1cc Lockheed Rep. NAS CorpC

09

PART IV - SIGNATURES (INC)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

CDR. USNR UNIT SAFETY OFF

(b) (6)

LT. USNR, ASST. MAINT. OFF.

UNIT BILL'S

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

SURV. EQPM. OFF.

USNR... (M.C.)

TU, JETS, OFF & LET

V. THE ACCIDENT.

A. At 1937 on 17 July 1957, LCDR H. L. HASKINS, instructor pilot, and ENS A. P. BURROWS, student pilot, departed NAS Forest Sherman, Pensacola, Florida, in TV-2, BUNO 138043, under instrument flight rules to NAAS Kingsville, Texas. The flight was of a training nature, designated as a 3D22 (C-7) cross-country.

D. ARTC cleared the flight via direct to Saufley, Red 96 to New Orleans, Green 6 to Corpus Christi, Red 30 to Bishop Intersection, direct to Kingsville, and also cleared them to maintain "1,000 feet on top". Actual altitudes enroute are unknown, but at Palacios, San Antonio ARTC cleared the flight to descend to 20,000 feet from 35,000 feet. Initial contact with Kingsville Approach Control was made over Corpus Christi at a reported altitude of 20,000 feet. Arrival at the Riviera Radio Beacon was six minutes later, at 2123. Approach Control had cleared the flight to commence a Kingsville jet penetration from 20,000 feet, with no delay and the penetration was commenced on arrival, at 2123. At 2126½, the student reported, "Inbound out of penetration turn." He reported Riviera inbound at 2130. Approach Control then gave instructions for the flight to: "Report Low Frequency Range Station on final." The receipt of this transmission was acknowledged by the student. At 2132 the following transmission was received by Approach Control, "MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, Fuel Pressure!!" and was identified from the tape recording as LCDR HASKINS' voice. The "MAYDAY" was acknowledged by Approach Control who immediately asked if 8043 would work the tower on the present frequency. Either the tower or Approach Control then asked if he had passed low station. The only answer was "EIGHT ZERO", (determined from tape recording). The next transmission from 8043 was, "800 feet, no choice but a night flame-out landing." The ensuing explosion on impact was observed at approximately 2134.

VI. DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT.

A. Strike damage was incurred by TV-2, BUNO 138043 as a result of impact with the ground, collision with numerous trees and fire. Initial contact was made by an undetermined part of the aircraft with two (2) wooden fence posts about four feet high and spaced approximately twelve feet apart. One post was broken off about two feet above the ground, the other lost about two inches from the top. This is the point of initial contact and all measurements will be taken from this point (Enclosures (8) and (9)). Ninety-six (96) feet further along a general flight path of 330° magnetic, a nine-inch diameter tree was struck by the port wing three feet above the ground and three feet inboard of the tip tank (Enclosure (10)). This section and the port tip tank parted from the aircraft. The tip tank was found 316 feet along, and eight feet to the right of the flight path. The severed section of the wing was recovered at 341 feet along and 25 feet to the right of the path of the aircraft. After striking this tree, the aircraft continued to disintegrate due to what was deduced to be a cartwheel or similar uncontrolled maneuver. Portions of

the port wing fuel cell and the port tip tank pressure lines were scattered along the flight path before the aircraft struck a second tree, 240 feet from initial contact and two feet above the ground, leaving a part of the port wing panel embedded and the outer half of the port aileron lying three feet to the left (Enclosure (11)). At 255 feet the inboard half of the port aileron was found. At 306 feet the aft section of the fuselage and the starboard horizontal stabilizer struck several limbs of another tree 12 feet above the terrain (Enclosures (12) and (13)). The aircraft was apparently in a right wing-high, tail-high attitude. A fourth tree, two feet in diameter, was contacted at a distance of 431 feet from initial contact with various components being scattered along the flight path over another 108 feet. Included in these components, and the order in which they were found, were the empennage (Enclosure (14)), port gunbay door.

B. In this general area, also, and to the left of the flight path, a part of the nose section, the starboard tip tank (in two (2) pieces), and a very small portion of the port aileron with electrical trim tab attached, were found. The first signs of fire were indicated in this area by small burned patches. At a point 674 feet from initial contact a fifth tree was struck and a part of the starboard wing and flap were found lodged in the base of the tree. A considerable area around this tree was badly burned. Perpendicular and 25 feet left of this point, the canopy was found. Thirty-five feet further (709 feet from initial contact) the instructor pilot's helmet was recovered.

C. It is believed that the engine and fuselage separated very near this point. An eleven foot section of the starboard wing was located at 769 feet and the engine came to rest at 829 feet from the point of initial contact. After the engine and the remainder of the fuselage separated, (Enclosure (15)), the fuselage veered in a curved path to the right. It came to rest against the base of a large tree on an approximate heading of 080°, due east of the engine. The windscreen assembly was recovered 25 feet beyond the tree (Enclosure (16)). The cockpits and forward portion of the fuselage were almost completely consumed by fire which made it impossible to ascertain final impact damage (Enclosure (17)).

VII. THE INVESTIGATION.

A. The crash occurred at 2134 as the explosion was observed by tower personnel.

B. Crash followed flame-out of undetermined cause.

C. Landing was made downwind with landing gear and speedbrakes up, landing flaps down.

D. Contact airspeed was estimated to be 130 knots, - 20 knots, in a relatively flat attitude.

E. The engine was not running on impact and suffered very little damage. It was examined by O&R and judged to be capable of proper operation.

F. One inverter was examined by O&R and all indications showed it was operating on contact.

G. The fuel transfer pumps were examined by O&R and this examination revealed only that they were capable of proper operation.

H. The front and rear cockpit totalizers were also examined by O&R. A reading of 96 gallons remaining in the fuel tanks could be positively determined from the last two (2) counter wheels, but it was impossible to extract a reading from the first wheel.

I. The aircraft was fueled with 725 gallons of JP-4 at NAS Forest Sherman. With a capacity of 813 gallons, the possibility of not having a full load prior to the starting of the engine is very remote.

J. Weather was not a contributing factor to this accident. However, it was a very dark night.

K. Both pilots were physically qualified to participate on this flight.

L. The canopy was jettisoned at a point 709 feet from initial contact.

M. LCDR HASKINS was in the front cockpit and ENS BURROWS was in the rear cockpit.

N. ENS BURROWS' ejection seat had been fired and was found in front of the port wing where the fuselage remains came to rest.

O. The body of ENS BURROWS was found approximately eight (8) feet outboard of the fuselage and slightly aft of the remaining port wing.

P. The review of the pilots discrepancy sheets indicate the following pertinent discrepancies and maintenance action taken:

1. On 13 March 1957 the pilot discrepancy form reported: Fuselage tank still reads full, (upon interrogation, the pilot stated that the fuselage tank showed "FULL" after taxiing out and returning to the line). The following maintenance action was taken: "Changed float valve."

2. On 25 May 1957 the pilot discrepancy form reported: Liquidometer stuck at full position. Maintenance action: "Unstuck and bent arm to prevent future sticking."

3. On 2 June 1957 the pilot discrepancy form reported: Fuselage tank stays full with the other tanks off. Maintenance action: "Unstuck liquidometer float. Turned up and checked out O.K."

4. On 8 June 1957 the pilot discrepancy form reported: Stuck fuselage float. Maintenance action: "Unstuck fuselage float."

VIII. THE ANALYSIS.

A. Due to the fact that this accident occurred at night in a rather isolated area, there were no witnesses who saw the aircraft contact the ground. It was determined from the tower operators observation and from the tower tape recording that the crash did occur at 2134. It was also determined from the tape recording that the pilot of TV-2, BUNO 138043 experienced fuel pressure difficulties and subsequent flame-out at or above 800 feet prior to the aforementioned crash.

B. The cause of the flame-out cannot be determined but could have resulted from any of the following possibilities:

1. Fuel control malfunction.
2. Fuel pump failure.
3. Inadvertent "stop-cocking".
4. The transferring of fuel manually and having a fuselage transmitter float stuck in the "UP" position.

C. Considered in the order as presented above, the following opinions are derived:

1. The fuel control was recovered and examined by Corpus Christi O&R and found to be capable of proper operation.
2. The fuel pumps were also examined by O&R and it was revealed that they were capable of proper operation prior to the crash. Even if the primary element of the fuel pump had failed, the fuel flow would have been maintained by the secondary element, which would have eliminated a flame-out.
3. Inadvertent "stop-cocking" cannot be completely ignored, but the experience of both pilots in TV type aircraft make this possibility remote.
4. The transferring of fuel manually plus having a fuselage transmitter float stuck in the "UP" position is considered another possible cause of the flame-out. Most pilots prefer to transfer manually on a cross-country flight to avoid a possible loss of fuel due to a malfunction of the fuel float system.

D. If LCDR HASKINS had been transferring manually and had not gang-barred the fuel switches, a flame-out would have occurred at a 258-gallon reading on the totalizer. However, the readings on both fuel totalizers which were sent to Corpus Christi O&R for examination revealed a reading of 296 gallons.

E. Upon examination of LCDR HASKINS' flight log (enclosure (3)) which was submitted to the clearing officer at NAS Forest Sherman, it was evident that he intended to fly at 35,000 feet. At Palacios, LCDR HASKINS requested and received a clearance to descend from 35,000 feet to 20,000 feet. Therefore, it is the Board's assumption that he did fly at this altitude even though he asked for and received a "1,000 feet on top" clearance. Fuel data on the flight log indicated that he would arrive at the Riviera Radio Beacon with 320 gallons of fuel remaining out of an estimated 780 gallons at take-off. From the Riviera Radio Beacon "high station" to the time of flame-out, enough fuel would have been consumed to give a reading of 296 gallons on the totalizers, however, a 296 gallon reading would preclude the possibility of airframe fuel system failure or mismanagement.

F. The possibility also exists that the totalizer readings could have been 196 gallons. In order to have flamed-out at this reading, the aircraft would have had to consume 100 additional gallons of fuel over pre-flight computations, at least 62 of which had to be taken from the leading edge and/or wing group. Due to LCDR HASKINS' limited cross-country instructional experience, taxi distance to take-off end of runway, delay for climb-out clearance, and type of climb-out clearance received, it is reasonable to assume that this additional fuel could have been consumed.

G. From 13 March 1957 to 8 June 1957, this aircraft had a discrepancy history of the fuselage transmitter float sticking in the "UP" position. This would indicate a full fuselage tank at all times - fuel or no fuel. If this were the case, the aircraft could have flamed-out without any indication on the fuel low level warning light, which should have gone on when 87 gallons were remaining. Since this light is located just above the airspeed indicator, and is the type which cannot be dimmed, it is reasonably safe to assume that had it gone on, at least one of the pilots would have observed it.

H. Since fire destroyed most of the aircraft, and left but little tangible evidence, the Board could come to no conclusion as to the probable cause of the flame-out.

I. Both pilots utilized lap belts, shoulder harness, and protective helmets, but impact severity was so great that this equipment was useless.

IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. Conclusion:

1. The primary cause of the accident is undetermined.

B. Recommendations:

1. Replace the present fuselage fuel quantity indicator with a capacitance type. It is believed this would be more reliable, and would also conform with other jet aircraft fuel calibration, i.e. pounds rather than gallons.

2. The installation of a fuel flow detector in the overboard drain. This would give pilots more confidence in the present TV fuel system, and promote the habit of "Gangbarring" the fuel switches. The Lockheed representative stated that this installation would require only a few man hours and be relatively inexpensive.

3. It should again be brought to the attention of all pilots that the yellow sheets should be thoroughly analyzed prior to each flight, and that the aircraft should not be accepted for flight if maintenance corrective action seems to be inadequate for any listed discrepancy.

4. Whether or not a wheels-down landing would have lessened the damage to this aircraft could not be determined. However, it is still recommended to land wheels-down on any emergency landing.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

- This report shall be filed in the event of an aircraft accident/incident which involves one or more of the following:
Death
Injury
Ditching
Water Crash
Bail-out or Ejection (attempted or successful)
Wherever physiological or psychological factors are involved
Aircraft Ground Accidents resulting in serious injury
- Completion of the form shall be the responsibility of the flight surgeon.
- For type accident and damage code refer to OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6A.
- This form shall be prepared in quadruplicate. One copy shall be turned over to the Aircraft Accident Board (or the Survival and

Intelligence Officer in the case of combat incidents), and the original shall be air mailed (regular mail within 250 miles of Washington, D.C.) direct to Chief of Naval Operations (OP-37) Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. within 4 working days following the accident. The third copy shall be mailed direct to Safety Equipment Branch, BUAE, Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. The fourth copy shall be forwarded direct via air mail (regular mail within 250 miles of Norfolk, Va.) to the U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Activity, Naval Air Station, Norfolk 11, Virginia. Where more than one aircraft is involved, separate forms must be completed for each aircraft where one or more of the requirements in paragraph 1. above are applicable. (Additional copies may be prepared for use of squadron flight surgeons and other interested individuals)

1. FROM (Ship or station address)	2. SERIAL NO.	3. ACCIDENT OCCURRED (Geographic location)	4. TIME (Local)	5. DATE
104AS, Kingsville, Texas	13-57	5 mi. bearing 145° from 104AS, Kingsville	2135	7-27-57
6. PLANE COVERED BY THIS REPORT	MODEL	SV. NO.	NO. OCCUPANTS	UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT
T-2	130013	2	ATU-212	Kingsville
7. OTHER PLANE (if involved)	MODEL	SV. NO.	NO. OCCUPANTS	UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT
8. NAME OF PILOT IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT (Last, first, middle)				
ROBERT, 1 Army Leroy				
UNIT PILOT ATTACHED TO				
ATU-212				
9. FLIGHT SURGEONS CHECK LIST				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED <input type="checkbox"/> SURVIVORS NARRATIVES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TO BE FORWARDED <input type="checkbox"/> COPIES FURNISHED <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> DATE				
10. READY FILED BY				
(b) (6)				
11. FORWARDED				
(b) (6)				
12. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT INCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> COMBAT INCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> GROUND ACCIDENT				

13. ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

INCLUDE HERE A PARAGRAPH GIVING A BRIEF BUT FACTUAL ACCOUNT DESCRIBING THE ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. INCLUDE SUCH CAUSES AS KNOWN, ESTIMATES OF "G" FORCES, ANGLES OF IMPACT, SPEED ON IMPACT, ATTITUDE ON IMPACT, ETC. ATTACH PHOTOGRAPHS WHEN PERTINENT.

This aircraft was on a routine syllabus cross country hop; was returning to Kingsville from Pensacola. At 2123, in Kingsville vicinity, a voice transmission announced commencing penetration. At 2127, a voice transmission announced out of penetration. At 2130, "Rifles, inbound" transmitted. At 2132, following transmission received: "Hayday, Hayday, Hayday! Fuel pressure!" At 2133, following transmission received: "Two miles south, 800 feet, flame out, night landing only thing possible!" Aircraft crashed approximately 5 miles south of field. Observers in tower saw explosion.

14. PILOT FACTORS (Check pertinent pilot factors listed below)

	PILOT	CO-PILOT		PILOT	CO-PILOT
IN CONTROL AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT	X		HYPOXIA SUSPECTED	No	No
AMOUNT OF FLIGHT TIME IN LAST 24 HOURS	1.2	1.2	CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING SUSPECTED	No	No
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN LAST 24 HOURS	1	1	FAULTY VISION	No	No
NUMBER HOURS DUTY IN LAST 24 HOURS	8	8	AERONBOLISM	No	No
HOURS SINCE LAST FULL MEAL	4	4	BLACKOUT, GREYOUT, REDOUT	No	No
TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	1:00	1:00	VERTIGO	No	No
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	322.9	279.7	NIGHT BLINDNESS	No	No
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME IN MODEL	215.6	39.9	FATIGUE	No	No
NUMBER PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS	3	0	DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES	No	No
DATE OF LAST ACCIDENT	7-20-57		UNFAMILIARITY IN TYPE AIRCRAFT	No	No
NUMBER DAYS GROUNDED IN LAST MONTH	0	11	ANXIETY REACTION	No	No
DATE LAST LOW PRESSURE INDOCTRINATION	6-12-57	1-25-57	LAST CER (date and score)	2-13-57 100	1-27-57 100
PHASE SLEEP IN LAST 24 HOURS	7:00	7:00	OTHER PERTINENT FACTORS IN ACCIDENT (describe below)		

15. COMMENTS ON ITEMS CHECKED UNDER ITEM 14 WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. WHERE APPLICABLE, COMMENT BELOW ON ANY OF THE ABOVE FACTORS AFFECTING CREW MEMBERS OR PASSENGERS

Ensign Barrows had been suffering domestic difficulties. For this reason, he had been grounded much of previous month. His wife had visited a psychiatrist. However, the situation had seemed to be improving, and is not considered to be a pertinent factor in this accident.

DIRECTIONS

- 1. Use separate form for each person.
- 2. Under Injury Class, use following key:

Class "A" Fatal injury, is considered for reporting procedure as one that results in death prior to submission of the Aircraft Accident Report.
Class "B" Critical injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury which threatens to result in death either from injuries sustained in the accident or from complications thereof. Critical injuries resulting in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressee.
Class "C" Serious injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than critical but definitely requiring five or more days hospitalization involving medical treatment but from which the individual will be expected to recover. Unsuspected critical conditions or complications are excepted.

Listed in this category which result in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressee.
Class "D" Minor injury is considered for reporting procedure as any injury less than serious.
Class "E" No injury.
Class "F" Unknown injury - lost and presumed drowned.
Class "G" Unknown injury - missing.
3. Under disposition, use following key:
"1" - uninjured
"2" - grounded
"3" - treated and returned to duty
"4" - hospitalized
"5" - remains recovered
"6" - remains not recovered

1. NAME	2. RANK/RATE	3. AGE	4. WEIGHT	5. HEIGHT
HERNAN, Alfred Arturo	(b) (6)	25	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
7. DUTY ABOARD PLANE, ON DECK/GROUND		8. POSITION OCCUPIED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT		9. INJURY CLASS
Student Pilot		Aft Cockpit		

11. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	MODEL/TYPE	AVAILABLE	USED	NOT USED	DAMAGED	LOST	WAS OXYGEN BEING USED	AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	PRE-OXYGENATION	IF YES, OXYGEN SUPPLY PRESSURE PRIOR TO FLIGHT	AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	WAS OXYGEN EQUIPMENT PRE-FLIGHTED BY PILOT	IF SHOULDER HARNESS USED	LOCKED	UNLOCKED	TIGHT	SLACK	PRESSED FORWARD AGAINST HARNESS	PRESSED AGAINST SEAT BACK	ON IMPACT	SAFETY BELT	LOCKED	TIGHT	SLACK
SHOULDER HARNESS	M1-10870	X	X		X																			
LAP BELT	M-10030	X	X		X																			
INERTIA REEL		X	X		X																			
"G" SUIT		X	X		X																			
HELMET		X	X		X																			
OXYGEN MASK		X	X		X																			
GOOGLES		X	X		X																			
SHOES (type)	H4C-4	X	X		X																			
FLIGHT SUIT, OTHER THAN "G" (type)																								
EXPOSURE SUIT (type)																								
OTHER (specify)																								

12. COMMENT ON EFFECTIVENESS (features of "As," "None," "as designed," etc., will not be accepted. If any equipment failed, describe failure and probable cause). Use additional sheet, if necessary.
Habit chin strap ineffective - blew off. Only on a crash landing could this have saved this man's life.

13. POST-CRASH EXAMINATION

IF DEAD, LIST PRIMARY CAUSE (multiple entries, as stated)	INTERNAL INJURIES
(b) (6)	(b) (6)
AUTOPSY FINDINGS, IF PERFORMED	IF HOSPITALIZED, DATE DISCHARGED

ESTIMATED LENGTH OF HOSPITALIZATION	LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION (as condition permits)
CARBON MONOXIDE NAME CHG TEST RESULTS	ESTIMATED LENGTH OF GROUNDING
To be forwarded.	
IF GROUNDING, REASON	

14. INJURIES

	DEGREE	1ST			2ND			3RD			CARBONIZATION ENTIRE BODY
		1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	
BURNS		(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	
FROSTBITE	AREA	HEAD (central)	HEAD (dorsal)	TRUNK (ventral)	TRUNK (dorsal)	EXTREMITIES (upper)	EXTREMITIES (lower)				
		(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)				

UNCONSCIOUSNESS	SHORT DURATION - LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE	OTHER (time)
	(b) (6)	

HEAD	CEREBRAL CONCUSSION	MINOR FACIAL INJURIES		MAJOR FACIAL INJURIES														
		RIGHT EYE	LEFT EYE	RIGHT EYE	LEFT EYE													
INJURIES	MINOR EYE INJURIES		MAJOR EYE INJURIES		MINOR EYE INJURIES		MAJOR EYE INJURIES											
	RIGHT EYE	LEFT EYE	RIGHT EYE	LEFT EYE	RIGHT EYE	LEFT EYE	RIGHT EYE	LEFT EYE										
TYPE	SKULL		VERTEBRAE (specify no.)		SHOULDER GIRDLE		RIBS		PELVIS		UPPER ARM/LOWER ARM		HAND		UPPER LEG/LOWER LEG		FOOT	
	CRANIAL	FACIAL	CERV	THOR.	LUMBAR	SACRAL	COCCYX											
BONES	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
SIMPLE	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
FRACTURE	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
COMPOUND	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
FRACTURE	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
COMMINUTE	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
FRACTURE	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
DIS-	JAW																	
LO-																		
CA-																		
TION																		
AMPUTATIONS - STATE PARTS																		

AREA OF INVOLVEMENT	LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS			DROWNED	SHOCK	EXPOSURE
	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE			
HEAD	VENTRAL											
	DORSAL											
NECK												
THORAX	VENTRAL											
	DORSAL											
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL											
	DORSAL											
EXTREMITIES (upper)												
EXTREMITIES (lower)												

15. CAUSE OF INJURIES (How obtained or in case of head injury indicated above. Give specific parts of aircraft involved. Entries of "As," "None," "as designed" or "as manufactured" with no qualification will not be accepted. Use additional sheet, if necessary.)
Cause of crash - loss of control.
Probably occurred immediately prior to or during a steep climb as indicated by the fact that the aircraft was inverted at the time of impact.
(b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

BAILOUT AND EJECTION REPORT (Use separate form for each person)				DATE REPORT 1-27-57	
NAME [redacted]		FILE NO. [redacted]		MODEL TV-2	
[redacted]		[redacted]		BU. NO. 13003	
1. AT TIME OF EJECTION				YES	NO
INDICATED AIR SPEED (Knots)		FEET IN STIMULUS			
ALTITUDE ABOVE SEA LEVEL		SEAT BELT FASTENED			
ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN		SHOULDER HARNESS LOCKED			
ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT		SHOULDER HARNESS TIGHT			
[redacted]		DISCONNECT USED (Give type)			
2. WERE "G" FORCES PRESENT <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO IF YES, STATE NATURE OF FORCE AND DIRECTION OF FORCE					
3. LIST DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED IN EJECTION (jettisoning canopy, parachute, ejecting, etc.)					
[redacted] Subject apparently ejected while plane was sliding along terrain during crash landing. Fall was immediate, and I thought seat separated automatically, there was no time to open chute.					
HOW LONG WAS FACE COVERED WHILE AFTER EJECTION					
DID SEAT TUMBLE IN TYPE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO (If yes, describe)					
AFTER LEAVING A/C <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO TYPE [redacted]					
AUTOMATIC LAP BELT RELEASE USED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO TYPE					
AUTOMATIC RIP CORD DEVICE USED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO TYPE					
TIME IN SEAT AFTER EJECTION (Seconds)					
[redacted] - pressure 2 seconds					
WERE ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN LEAVING SEAT <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO					
5. BAILOUT ONLY			6. BAILOUT AND EJECTIONS		
INDICATED AIRSPEED (Knots)			WAS FREE FALL DELIBERATE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
ALTITUDE ABOVE SEA LEVEL			WAS BAILOUT OXY-GEN AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO TYPE		
ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN			ALTITUDE RIP CORD PULLED		
ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT			ALTITUDE CHUTE OPENED		
BAILOUT OVER RIGHTSIDE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			BODY POSITION WHEN CHUTE OPENED		
BAILOUT OVER LEFTSIDE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			TYPE PARACHUTE		
BAILOUT, INVERTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			CHUTE HARNESS CINCHED TIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
7. LIST ANY DIFFICULTIES IN PULLING RIP CORD OR CHUTE OPENING			CHUTE DAMAGE		
[redacted] Insufficient time			[redacted] None		
8. DESCRIBE NATURE OF TERRAIN Landed on (rocky, loose, water, etc.)					
[redacted] Flat - with scrubby growth of mesquite					
9. POSITION OF BODY ON LANDING					
10. STATE WHERE Landed on parachute (on back) (note, direction)					
[redacted] Does not apply					
11. METHOD OF RESCUE (list difficulties)					
[redacted] Does not apply					
12. LIST TRAINING INDIVIDUAL HAD FOR BAILOUT OR EJECTION					
[redacted] 1-26-57 Ejection seat movie, lecture & indoctrination "shot" TV type.					
13. SAFETY EQUIPMENT					
TYPE	USED	DAMAGED	LOST	DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE OR WHEN LOST	
HELMET	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
GOGGLES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
OXYGEN MASK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
CLOTHING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
GLOVES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			Gloves burned	
SHOES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			Partially covered in flash explosion or burn	
14. OTHER SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT (list contents and damage)					
[redacted] No Vest <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> burned around collar region					
15. INCLUDE SURVIVOR NARRATIVE OF ENTIRE PROCEDURE (Include comments on wind blast, force of ejection, emotion, etc.)					

DIRECTIONS

1. Use separate form for each person.
2. Under Injury Class, use following key:

Class "A" Fatal injury, is considered for reporting procedure as one that results in death prior to submission of the Aircraft Accident Report.
Class "B" Critical injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury which threatens to result in death either from injuries sustained in the accident or from complications thereof. Critical injuries resulting in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressee.
Class "C" Serious injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than critical but definitely requiring five or more days hospitalization involving medical treatment but from which the individual will be expected to recover. Unsuspected critical conditions or complications are exempted.

listed in this category which result in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressee.
Class "D" Minor injury is considered for reporting procedure as any injury less than serious.
Class "E" No injury.
Class "F" Unknown injury - lost and presumed drowned.
Class "G" Unknown injury - missing.
Under disposition, use following key:
"1" - Uninjured
"2" - grounded
"3" - Unretained and returned to duty
"4" - hospitalized
"5" - remain recovered
"6" - remain not recovered

1. NAME **RAKID, Harry Leroy** 2. BIRTH/DATE **1918** 3. AGE **36** 4. WEIGHT **(b) (6)** 5. HEIGHT **(b) (6)**

7. DUTY ASSIGNMENT, ON BOARD/AROUND **Instructor - Pilot** 8. POSITION OCCUPIED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT **Pure Cockpit** 9. INJURY CLASS **A** 10. DISPOSITION **T**

11. SAFETY EQUIPMENT	MODEL/TYPE	AVAILABLE	USED	NOT USED	DAMAGED	LOST	WAS OXYGEN BEING USED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	YES	NO
SHOULDER HARNESS	RA-41870	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
LAP BELT	RA-41870	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
INERTIA REEL	A	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
"G" SUIT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HELMET	A-4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OXYGEN MASK	A-4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
GOOGLES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SHOES (type)	unknown	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FLIGHT SUIT, OTHER THAN "G" (type)	unknown	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EXPOSURE SUIT (type)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OTHER (specify)	Life vest RA-4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

12. COMMENT ON EFFECTIVENESS (Batteries of "B", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I", "J", "K", "L", "M", "N", "O", "P", "Q", "R", "S", "T", "U", "V", "W", "X", "Y", "Z", "AA", "AB", "AC", "AD", "AE", "AF", "AG", "AH", "AI", "AJ", "AK", "AL", "AM", "AN", "AO", "AP", "AQ", "AR", "AS", "AT", "AU", "AV", "AW", "AX", "AY", "AZ", "BA", "BB", "BC", "BD", "BE", "BF", "BG", "BH", "BI", "BJ", "BK", "BL", "BM", "BN", "BO", "BP", "BQ", "BR", "BS", "BT", "BU", "BV", "BW", "BX", "BY", "BZ", "CA", "CB", "CC", "CD", "CE", "CF", "CG", "CH", "CI", "CJ", "CK", "CL", "CM", "CN", "CO", "CP", "CQ", "CR", "CS", "CT", "CU", "CV", "CW", "CX", "CY", "CZ", "DA", "DB", "DC", "DD", "DE", "DF", "DG", "DH", "DI", "DJ", "DK", "DL", "DM", "DN", "DO", "DP", "DQ", "DR", "DS", "DT", "DU", "DV", "DW", "DX", "DY", "DZ", "EA", "EB", "EC", "ED", "EE", "EF", "EG", "EH", "EI", "EJ", "EK", "EL", "EM", "EN", "EO", "EP", "EQ", "ER", "ES", "ET", "EU", "EV", "EW", "EX", "EY", "EZ", "FA", "FB", "FC", "FD", "FE", "FF", "FG", "FH", "FI", "FJ", "FK", "FL", "FM", "FN", "FO", "FP", "FQ", "FR", "FS", "FT", "FU", "FV", "FW", "FX", "FY", "FZ", "GA", "GB", "GC", "GD", "GE", "GF", "GG", "GH", "GI", "GJ", "GK", "GL", "GM", "GN", "GO", "GP", "GQ", "GR", "GS", "GT", "GU", "GV", "GW", "GX", "GY", "GZ", "HA", "HB", "HC", "HD", "HE", "HF", "HG", "HH", "HI", "HJ", "HK", "HL", "HM", "HN", "HO", "HP", "HQ", "HR", "HS", "HT", "HU", "HV", "HW", "HX", "HY", "HZ", "IA", "IB", "IC", "ID", "IE", "IF", "IG", "IH", "II", "IJ", "IK", "IL", "IM", "IN", "IO", "IP", "IQ", "IR", "IS", "IT", "IU", "IV", "IW", "IX", "IY", "IZ", "JA", "JB", "JC", "JD", "JE", "JF", "JG", "JH", "JI", "JJ", "JK", "JL", "JM", "JN", "JO", "JP", "JQ", "JR", "JS", "JT", "JU", "JV", "JW", "JX", "JY", "JZ", "KA", "KB", "KC", "KD", "KE", "KF", "KG", "KH", "KI", "KJ", "KK", "KL", "KM", "KN", "KO", "KP", "KQ", "KR", "KS", "KT", "KU", "KV", "KW", "KX", "KY", "KZ", "LA", "LB", "LC", "LD", "LE", "LF", "LG", "LH", "LI", "LJ", "LK", "LL", "LM", "LN", "LO", "LP", "LQ", "LR", "LS", "LT", "LU", "LV", "LW", "LX", "LY", "LZ", "MA", "MB", "MC", "MD", "ME", "MF", "MG", "MH", "MI", "MJ", "MK", "ML", "MN", "MO", "MP", "MQ", "MR", "MS", "MT", "MU", "MV", "MW", "MX", "MY", "MZ", "NA", "NB", "NC", "ND", "NE", "NF", "NG", "NH", "NI", "NJ", "NK", "NL", "NM", "NO", "NP", "NQ", "NR", "NS", "NT", "NU", "NV", "NW", "NX", "NY", "NZ", "OA", "OB", "OC", "OD", "OE", "OF", "OG", "OH", "OI", "OJ", "OK", "OL", "OM", "ON", "OO", "OP", "OQ", "OR", "OS", "OT", "OU", "OV", "OW", "OX", "OY", "OZ", "PA", "PB", "PC", "PD", "PE", "PF", "PG", "PH", "PI", "PJ", "PK", "PL", "PM", "PN", "PO", "PP", "PQ", "PR", "PS", "PT", "PU", "PV", "PW", "PX", "PY", "PZ", "QA", "QB", "QC", "QD", "QE", "QF", "QG", "QH", "QI", "QJ", "QK", "QL", "QM", "QN", "QO", "QP", "QQ", "QR", "QS", "QT", "QU", "QV", "QW", "QX", "QY", "QZ", "RA", "RB", "RC", "RD", "RE", "RF", "RG", "RH", "RI", "RJ", "RK", "RL", "RM", "RN", "RO", "RP", "RQ", "RR", "RS", "RT", "RU", "RV", "RW", "RX", "RY", "RZ", "SA", "SB", "SC", "SD", "SE", "SF", "SG", "SH", "SI", "SJ", "SK", "SL", "SM", "SN", "SO", "SP", "SQ", "SR", "SS", "ST", "SU", "SV", "SW", "SX", "SY", "SZ", "TA", "TB", "TC", "TD", "TE", "TF", "TG", "TH", "TI", "TJ", "TK", "TL", "TM", "TN", "TO", "TP", "TQ", "TR", "TS", "TT", "TU", "TV", "TW", "TX", "TY", "TZ", "UA", "UB", "UC", "UD", "UE", "UF", "UG", "UH", "UI", "UJ", "UK", "UL", "UM", "UN", "UO", "UP", "UQ", "UR", "US", "UT", "UU", "UV", "UW", "UX", "UY", "UZ", "VA", "VB", "VC", "VD", "VE", "VF", "VG", "VH", "VI", "VJ", "VK", "VL", "VM", "VN", "VO", "VP", "VQ", "VR", "VS", "VT", "VU", "VV", "VW", "VX", "VY", "VZ", "WA", "WB", "WC", "WD", "WE", "WF", "WG", "WH", "WI", "WJ", "WK", "WL", "WM", "WN", "WO", "WP", "WQ", "WR", "WS", "WT", "WU", "WV", "WW", "WX", "WY", "WZ", "XA", "XB", "XC", "XD", "XE", "XF", "XG", "XH", "XI", "XJ", "XK", "XL", "XM", "XN", "XO", "XP", "XQ", "XR", "XS", "XT", "XU", "XV", "XW", "XX", "XY", "XZ", "YA", "YB", "YC", "YD", "YE", "YF", "YG", "YH", "YI", "YJ", "YK", "YL", "YM", "YN", "YO", "YP", "YQ", "YR", "YS", "YT", "YU", "YV", "YW", "YX", "YY", "YZ", "ZA", "ZB", "ZC", "ZD", "ZE", "ZF", "ZG", "ZH", "ZI", "ZJ", "ZK", "ZL", "ZM", "ZN", "ZO", "ZP", "ZQ", "ZR", "ZS", "ZT", "ZU", "ZV", "ZW", "ZX", "ZY", "ZZ")
Safety equipment ineffective. Hard hat and connected oxygen mask separated from head.

IN CASE OF BURNS, FREEZING, OR FROSTBITE, LIST ALL CLOTHING WORN. USE ADDITIONAL SHEET, IF NECESSARY.

Unknown - carbonization.

13. POST CRASH EXAMINATION

IF DEAD, LIST PRIMARY CAUSE (multiple entries, as state)	INTERNAL INJURIES
Multiple, Extremes	
AUTOPSY FINDINGS, IF PERFORMED	IF HOSPITALIZED, GIVE DIAGNOSIS
See enclosed protocol	
ESTIMATED LENGTH OF HOSPITALIZATION	LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION (no condition permits)
CARBON MONOXIDE NAME COND TEST RESULTS	
IF GROUNDING, REASON	ESTIMATED LENGTH OF GROUNDING

14. INJURIES

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BURNS	DEGREE (b) (6)	CARBONIZATION (ENTIRE BODY OR PARTS)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FROSTBITE	AREA (b) (6)	

UNCONSCIOUSNESS ☐ SHORT DURATION-LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (time)

HEAD CEREBRAL CONCUSSION ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☐ FATAL MINOR FACIAL INJURIES MAJOR FACIAL INJURIES

INJURIES MINOR EYE INJURIES ☐ RIGHT EYE ☐ LEFT EYE MAJOR EYE INJURIES **19** ☐ RIGHT EYE ☐ LEFT EYE

TYPE SKULL VERTEBRAE (specify no.) SHOULDER GIRDLE RIBS PEL-VIS UPPER ARM LOWER ARM HAND UPPER LEG LOWER LEG FOOT

BOONES	CRANIAL	FACIAL	CERV	THOR	LUMBAR	SACRAL	*COCYX	SHOULDER	GIRDLE	RIBS	PELVIS	UPPER ARM	LOWER ARM	HAND	UPPER LEG	LOWER LEG	FOOT
SIMPLE	(b) (6)																
FRACTURE																	
COMPOUND																	
FRACTURE																	
COMMINUTED																	
FRACTURE																	

DIS.	JAW							SHOULDER	ELBOW	WRIST	HIP	KNEE	ANKLE
LD.													
CA.													
TION													

NOTATIONS (STYL) PARTS **(b) (6)**

AREA OF INVOLVEMENT		LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS			<input type="checkbox"/> DROWNED	
		MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE		
HEAD	VENTRAL										<input type="checkbox"/> SHOCK	EXPOSURE
	DORSAL											
NECK											<input type="checkbox"/> MILD	<input type="checkbox"/> MILD
THORAX	VENTRAL										<input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE	<input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE
	DORSAL											
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL										<input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE	<input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE
	DORSAL											
EXTREMITIES (upper)												
EXTREMITIES (lower)												

15. CAUSE OF INJURIES (Describe position or the cause of each injury indicated above. Give specific parts of anatomy involved. If "Indeterminate" with no explanation will not be accepted. Use additional sheet, if necessary.)

(b) (6) **(b) (6)**

(COPY)

CLINICAL RECORD

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL

DATE AND HOUR DIED		DATE AND HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED		CHECK ONE		
7-17-57	A. M. 2135 P. M.	7-18-57	A. M. 1500	FULL AUTOPSY	HEAD ONLY	TRUNK ONLY
PROSECUTOR (b) (6) LT MC USNR		ASSISTANT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		

CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS (Including Operations)

D.M.

Aircraft accident five miles S. E. of NAAS, Kingsville, Texas, in a TVJ jet plane.

Frozen sections and body fluid sent to Aviation School of Medicine, Randolph Field, Texas, and to 44AML, BANC, Ft. San Houston, Texas, for toxicological studies for general unknown. Was sent by plane 7-19-57.

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES

(b) (6)

20

APPROVED—SIGNATURE	(b) (6) LT MC USNR	AUTOPSY NO.	A57-31
PATIENT'S LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE	BURNING, Alfred Porrow, (b) (6) USNR-2	REGISTER NO.	87584-0
		WARD NO.	Morgan

(NAME OF HOSPITAL OR OTHER MEDICAL FACILITY)

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL
Standard Form 590

(COPY)

U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

HR32-25-sub
M1/1
A57-31
18 July 1957

REPORT, Alfred Farrow, M.D. (b) (6) USNR-E

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

This was the body of a well developed, well nourished, white male,
about 25 years of age, (b) (6) The
hair was close-cropped and red-brown. (b) (6)

(b) (6)

INTERNAL EXAMINATION

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Heart: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

PERSONS, Alfred Barrow, JR. (b) (6) USMR-2

BM32-25-sub
M1/1
A57-31
18 July 1957

Lungs: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Spleen: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Abdominal lymph nodes: (b) (6)

Liver: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Gallbladder: (b) (6)

Extrahepatic biliary passages: (b) (6)

Pancreas: (b) (6)

Adrenal glands: (b) (6)

Gastro-intestinal tract: (b) (6)

Kidneys: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Urinary bladder: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Skeleton: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Muscles: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Head: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Brain: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(COPY)

CLINICAL RECORD

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL

DATE AND HOUR DIED 7-17-57 A.M. 2135 P.M.		DATE AND HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED 7-18-57 1115 A.M. P.M.		CHECK ONE		
PATIENT (b) (6) LT MC USNR		ASSISTANT		FULL AUTOPSY	HEAD ONLY	TRUNK ONLY
				X		

CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS (Including operations)

DOA.

Aircraft accident, TV 2 jet plane, five miles S. E. of NAAS, Kingsville, Texas.

Specimens: Frozen tissue, bodyfluid and muscle tissue forwarded by a Beechcraft 920 on 7-19-57, to Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, Texas, and to 44AML, BANG, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, for toxicological studies for general unknown and lactic acid determinations.

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES

1) Multiple injuries, extensive.

23

SIGNATURE (b) (6) LT MC USNR		AUTOPSY NO. A57-30	
PATIENT'S LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME HARRIS, Harry Leroy, LCDR, (b) (6) USN		REGISTER NO. 87583-D	WARD NO. Xorgue

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL
Standard Form 505

(NAME OF HOSPITAL OR OTHER MEDICAL FACILITY)

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

HL/1
A57-30
18 July 1957

HASKINS, RAYZ LEROY, LCDR.

(b) (6)

USN

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

(b) (6)



C O P Y

U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

HR-25-sub
HL/1
AST-00
18 July 1957

WALKER, Harry Leroy, LCDR.

(b) (6)

USN

(b) (6)



INTERNAL EXAMINATION

(b) (6)



(b) (6)



(b) (6)



(COPY)

HASKINS, HARRY LEON, JR.

(b) (6)

USN

HR32-25-sub

NO/1

A57-30

18 July 1957

(b) (6)

Spleen: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Abdominal lymph nodes: (b) (6)

Liver: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Gallbladder: (b) (6)

Extra-

Hepatic biliary passages: (b) (6)

Pancreas: (b) (6)

Adrenals: (b) (6)

Gastro-intestinal tract: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Kidneys: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Urinary bladder: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Prostate: (b) (6)

Muscles: See external examination.

Skeleton: (b) (6)

Head: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Fresh gross specimens were retained for toxicological studies for general unknown. A muscle specimen was retained and frozen for lactic acid determination. Urine and blood sample were obtained under oil. Spinal fluid was not obtainable.

AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE (DELIVER DUPLICATE TO BASE OPERATIONS AT DESTINATION)						DATE 7/17/57
A. OPERATIONS OFFICE NAS Pensacola						AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 132003
B. OCCUPANTS (State whether crew or passenger. List additional passengers on separate sheet and attach)						
DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	ORGANIZATION	HOME STATION		
PILOT IN COMMAND	HASKINS, H.C.	LTJG	USN	NAH, KINGSVILLE		
COPILOT	BURKINS, A.P.	ENS	USMC	NAH, KINGSVILLE		
<p>725th JP-4 112-58620</p> <p>2 STUB # 712240</p> <p>5/14 15/DM</p> <p>SIDE NO 115</p>						
C. FLIGHT PLAN						
RADIO CALL V 5043		AIRCRAFT TYPE V-2		POINT OF DEPARTURE NAS Pensacola		
ROUTE TO BE FLOWN				BASE NAME OF DESTINATION NAH, KINGSVILLE		
IFR	VFR	ALTITUDE	ROUTE	TO	MILEAGE	ETD
✓		10000	→	NAVY	611	1900
			R-30	MSY	EST TRUE AD	ETE
			G-6	SRP	374	1941
			E-30	BISHOP	ALTERNATE	ETE TO ALTERNATE
			→	NGI 7	LPR 50	0+13
TRANS. FREQ.					PLOT'S LAST NAME	
18 UHF Channel 16					HASKINS	
FUEL ON BOARD					HIGHEST RANK ON BOARD	
3					0	
INSTRUMENT RATING						
NAVY		AIR FORCE		ARMY		
SPECIAL PILOT		PILOT RATING		PILOT RATING		
STANDARD PILOT		INST. RATING		INST. RATING		
21 INSTRUMENT CARD EXPIRES 3/27/58						
DD FORM 300 FILED AT					DATE FILED	
HIGHEST RANK ON BOARD					LETDOWN AVAILABLE AT DESTINATION	
Letdown					NOTAMS CHECKED	
LETDOWN EQUIPMENT ABOARD AIRCRAFT						
LS	VOR	✓	RADIO RANGE	TACAN	LS	VOR
REMARKS						
(b) (6)						
D. WEATHER						
DESTINATION		TIME OF DEPT		DESTINATION (ETA)		
NAH, KINGSVILLE		1800		NGI 250/010R8		
ALTERNATE		TIME OF ARR		ALTERNATE (ETE)		
MIN CIG 500		MAX CIG TOPS 4000		THUNDER		HAZ
MIN VIS 15		DIST OR HAZE		RAIN		FOG
MIN PRZ 15		FT Icing		SNOW		BRICKS VIB AFTER
WINDS				SIGNATURE		
				462		
E. FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION						
SUBMITTED TO		TIME		BY		
INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL TRANS TO SENIOR OR PILOT BY				NOTED BY TIME		
STATION ARRIVED AT		TIME		GRADE OR POSITION		

CLEARANCES

POSIT REP DATA

NAVY JET
POSITION
TIME
ALTITUDE
FLY CONDITION
ETA NEXT REP POINT
INST FLIGHT PLAN
REMARKS

ALT CORR

70 TIME

TO CORR 760

194

TO	CUS	AI	POS	ETA	GA	ALT	REMARKS
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TOTALS							

28

PLANNING CHECK LIST

ITEM	DEST	ALT	ALT
CONTENTS NAV KIT			
FIELD NAME			
HOURS OF OPERATION			
LIGHTING			
SERVICING			
FUEL			
JASU			
ELEVATION			
RUNWAY LENGTH			
LANDING ROLL			
T. O. ROLL			
INST LANDING AID			
JET APPR CHART			
H. O. FIC			
SAFE ALT			
UNF STEEP			
BROADCAST STAT			

ALTITUDES	ICEING RULES
NORTH - AMBER, BLUE - ODD	FREEZING RAIN - Climb
SOUTH - AMBER, BLUE - EVEN	WET SNOW - Climb
NORTH - GREEN, RED - ODD	SLEET - Remain same level
SOUTH - GREEN, RED - EVEN	ICING IN TURB CLDS - Descend if possible; if not, climb rapidly above clds

ADIZ, AIRSPACE RESTRICTED AREAS

NOTAMS

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DESTINATION AND NOTES

STATEMENTS OF TOWER OPERATORS CONCERNING ACCIDENT TV-2, BUNO 138043

Navy 8043 was completing a Kingsville standard penetration, had reported Riviera inbound at 2130, was advised to report low frequency range on final----his transmission was "Roger", and at this time and up until now everything was normal.

At 2132 the following transmission was made by 8043 on Channel 5, 252.4:

"MAYDAY, MAYDAY, Flame-out."

At this time Mr. TIGER called the tower on intercom to advise, as there was jet traffic in the pattern.

I called 8043 and asked him to work the tower on this frequency--and asked him if he had passed the range station, so I could get a better fix on him. 8043 came back with "Flame-out. No choice but night flame-out landing."

Tower was advised of this by Mr. TIGER and asked if they were hearing him. The tower replied, "It is too late the aircraft has crashed and is burning south of the field."

Omar T. CRABB
Approach Controller

Witness: Marion F. TIGER

Attachment to strip for Navy 8043:


From position in tower cab, the only transmission heard was on 252.4 as follows:

"MAYDAY 8043 flame-out. No choice but night crash landing, am at 800 feet."


John T. EHMAN

Gene A. ROBINSON


Enclosure (4)



ENCL. (7) AAR-13-57 TV-2 BU.#138043 WRECKAGE DIAGRAM.



ENCL (8) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. AERIAL VIEW IMPACT AREA
LOOKING NORTHWEST.



ENCL (9) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. AERIAL VIEW OF IMPACT AREA LOOKING SOUTHEAST.



ENCL (10) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. FIRST TREE - CONTACTED BY PORT WING.

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ENCL (10) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. FIRST TREE - CONTACTED BY PORT WING.

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ENCL (11) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. VIEW FROM THIRD TREE LOOKING SOUTHEAST SHOWS
SECOND TREE, FIRST TREE, AND INITIAL CONTACT POINT.

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ENCL (12) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU/138043. THIRD TREE - SHOWING SCAR WHERE A/C SHEARED
LARGE LIMB PORT TIP AT BASE OF TREE.

37



ENCL (13) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. VIEW FROM THIRD TREE LOOKING NORTHWEST SHOWS
FLIGHT PATH AFTER CONTACT OF THIRD TREE.



ENCL (14) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. EMPENNAGE AND PORT GUNBAY DOOR HEADING 330°.



ENCL (15) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. VIEW OF ENGINE SHOWING VERY LITTLE DAMAGE.



ENCL (16) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. REMAINDER OF FUSELAGE.



ENCL (17) AAR 13-57 TV-2 BU#138043. VIEW SHOWING BURNED INTERIOR OF FRONT AND REAR COCKPIT.